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A BLUNDER OF SUPREME PROPORTIONS: 
GENERAL JURISDICTION AFTER DAIMLER 
AG V. BAUMAN 
Kaitlin Hanigan 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As with all facets of the judicial process, personal jurisdiction 
should be fair, uniform, and predictable.
1
 This fundamental doctrine 
should not favor plaintiffs over defendants.
2
 Instead, personal 
jurisdiction should provide nonresident defendants guidance on how 
to avoid the reach of a foreign state.
3
 However, this doctrine should 
also ensure plaintiffs a convenient forum without undue burden or 
delay. Despite the weight of these fundamental policy concerns, the 
jurisprudence surrounding general jurisdiction remains rife with 
ambiguity and inconsistency, even after the Supreme Court’s most 
recent opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman.
4
 
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of 
Daimler. Part III then examines the historical background of personal 
jurisdiction, including the origins of general jurisdiction. Part IV 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of general jurisdiction 
after Daimler. Part V presents the ramifications of Daimler. Finally, 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English Literature, 
Stanford University, June 2012. Thank you to Professor Simona Grossi for her guidance and 
feedback on this Comment. And thank you to the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their work on this Issue. 
 1. See generally Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No 
Boundaries, 47 AKRON L. REV. 617 (2014) (examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and 
the lower courts’ confusion, and suggesting a new rule based on connecting factors and 
expectations). 
 2. See Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities in 
Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I 
Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1–2 (2014). 
 3. See id. (“[A] foreign corporation that decides to make a significant sales effort in the 
United States or the European Union (E.U.) should be able to know (or at least get reasonably 
certain advice on) whether and to what extent those commercial activities expand the horizon of 
forum choices in suits against them.”). 
 4. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
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Part VI concludes that the Court should have avoided Daimler 
altogether, and clarified the standard for general jurisdiction on a 
more appropriate occasion. 
II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2004, twenty-two individuals (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
5
 
Plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MBA) had 
collaborated with Argentinian state security forces to kidnap, detain, 
torture, and kill Plaintiffs and their relatives during Argentina’s 
“Dirty War.”
6
 
Plaintiffs advanced claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 as well as wrongful death and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
7
 The complaint 
described incidents that occurred in Gonzalez Catan, Argentina while 
Plaintiffs worked at an MBA plant.
8
 Plaintiffs never alleged that 
MBA’s “collaboration with the Argentinian authorities took place in 
California or anywhere else in the United States.”
9
 
In the complaint, Plaintiffs named one defendant, 
DaimlerChrysler (“Daimler”).
10
 Daimler, a German public stock 
company, manufactured Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and 
maintained its corporate headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.
11
 After 
“a merger in 1998, the American Chrysler Corporation became one 
of [Daimler]’s wholly owned subsidiaries.”
12
 At the commencement 
of the action, Daimler maintained “no offices or persistent operations 
in California.”
13
 One of Daimler’s California contacts was its counsel 
 
 5. Id. at 751. One of the Plaintiffs was a resident of Argentina but a citizen of Chile. The 
other twenty-one Plaintiffs were Argentinean citizens and residents. Id. at 750, n.1; see Suzanna 
Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court Should Duck the Issue in 
DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111, 112 (2013) (noting that the 
Daimler Plaintiffs filed in California because the Ninth Circuit has a “reputation as one of the 
most liberal and plaintiff-friendly courts in the nation”). 
 6. Sherry, supra note 5, at 111–12. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 8. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751–52. 
 9. Id. at 752. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Todd W. Noelle, At Home in the Outer Limits: DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman and the 
Bounds of General Personal Jurisdiction, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 17, 19 
(2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp_sidebar/105/ (internal citation 
omitted). 
 13. Id. 
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in San Francisco, hired to represent Daimler in several lawsuits 
challenging the state’s clean air laws.
14
 Daimler also manufactured 
products specifically tailored to California’s market and maintained a 
listing on the Pacific Stock Exchange in San Francisco and a 
corporate partnership with the California-based Global Nature 
Fund.
15
 
Plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler vicariously liable for the acts 
of MBA, a subsidiary wholly owned by Daimler’s predecessor in 
interest.
16
 However, Daimler moved to dismiss the action for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.
17
 In opposing the motion, Plaintiffs submitted 
declarations and exhibits, which attempted to establish Daimler’s 
contacts in California.
18
 As an alternative, Plaintiffs urged the district 
court to find jurisdiction by imputing Mercedes-Benz USA’s 
(MBUSA’s) California contacts to Daimler.
19
 
At the time Plaintiffs filed the complaint, Daimler exclusively 
exported Mercedes-Benz automobiles to MBUSA, which then 
distributed the cars to independent dealerships throughout the United 
States.
20
 Although it maintained a principal place of business in New 
Jersey and incorporated in Delaware, MBUSA operated multiple 
facilities in California, “including a regional office in Costa Mesa, a 
Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in 
Irvine.”
21
 Indeed, “MBUSA is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles 
to the California market. In particular, over 10 % of all sales of new 
vehicles in the United States take place in California, and MBUSA’s 
California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales.”
22
  
The district court granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss on the 
ground that Daimler’s own California affiliations were insufficient to 
support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the corporation.
23
 
Additionally, the district court declined to attribute MBUSA’s 
 
 14. Bauman v. DaimlerChrylser AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 15. Id. at *7–8. 
 16. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. The “General Distributor Agreement” described MBUSA as an independent 
contractor, as opposed to an “agent, partner, joint venturer or employee of” Daimler. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. “Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this case into the specific jurisdiction 
category.” Id. at 758. 
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contacts to Daimler on an agency theory because Plaintiffs had failed 
to demonstrate that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent.
24
 
On appeal, Plaintiffs did not challenge the district court’s 
holding that Daimler’s own California contacts were insufficient to 
support the exercise of general jurisdiction.
25
 Instead, Plaintiffs 
appealed whether MBUSA’s contacts with California could be 
imputed on a general jurisdiction theory.
26
 
Initially, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.
27
 Only addressing the question of agency, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Plaintiffs had not adequately demonstrated an 
agency relationship between MBUSA and Daimler.
28
 Judge 
Reinhardt dissented, and argued that MBUSA and Daimler’s 
relationship satisfied the agency test and “considerations of 
reasonableness did not bar the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”
29
 
After granting Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, however, “the 
panel withdrew its initial opinion and replaced it with the one 
provided by [Judge] Reinhardt.”
30
 The Ninth Circuit held that “at 
least for the limited purpose of determining general jurisdiction, 
MBUSA was [Daimler’s] agent.”
31
 In its conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had moved away from 
“mechanical tests that fail to take account of reality,” and pointed out 
that corporations like Daimler establish subsidiaries like MBUSA for 
the sole purpose of reaping the economic benefits of the American 
marketplace without facing any jurisdictional consequences.
32
 
According to Judge Reinhardt, “it would seem off, indeed, if the 
manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz vehicles, which are sold in 
 
 24. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *19–20 
(N.D. Cal. 2005). The district court tentatively granted the motion to dismiss on November 22, 
2005, but before making a final decision, ordered plaintiffs to undertake limited jurisdictional 
discovery. Id. On February 12, 2007, the district court affirmed its tentative order to grant the 
motion to dismiss because Daimler’s “contacts with California [were] not ‘systematic and 
continuous.’” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 25. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758. 
 26. Id. at 753. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 32. Id. 
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California in vast numbers . . . could not be required to appear in the 
federal courts of that state.”
33
 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide “whether, 
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Daimler was amenable to suit in California courts for 
claims involving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring 
entirely abroad.”
34
 The Court held that Daimler was not amenable to 
suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by MBA’s conduct in 
Argentina.
35
 
III.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The standards applied to personal jurisdiction can be largely 
attributed to United States Supreme Court decisions.
36
 The Court’s 
jurisprudence has developed two categories under which jurisdiction 
may be exercised: the traditional bases and the “minimum contacts” 
test.
37
 In Pennoyer v. Neff,
38
 the Court recognized the traditional 
bases of personal jurisdiction: domicile, voluntary appearance, 
consent to process, and physical presence.
39
 Later, in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington,
40
 the Supreme Court developed the 
minimum contacts test, holding that even if the defendant were not 
physically present in the forum, he could still have “certain minimum 
contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
41
 
International Shoe’s conception of “fair play and substantial justice” 
presaged the later development of specific and general jurisdiction. 
While the Court has often addressed specific jurisdiction, it has 
only ever issued two opinions on general jurisdiction before granting 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753. 
 35. Id. at 748. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined. Id. at 750. 
Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring only in judgment. Id. 
 36. Grossi, supra note 1, at 621. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 39. See Grossi, supra note 1, at 621 (“The traditional bases of personal jurisdiction include 
domicile, voluntary appearance, consent to service of process, and physical presence. Each of 
these forms is consistent with the sovereignty principle announced in Pennoyer v. Neff.”) (citing 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)). 
 40. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 41. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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certiorari on Daimler: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
42
 
and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall.
43
 In Perkins, the 
Court found the exercise of general jurisdiction proper over a 
corporation’s president who had established an office in Ohio while 
the Japanese occupied its corporate headquarters during World War 
II.
44
 In Helicopteros, the Court precluded a Texas court from 
exercising general jurisdiction over a helicopter supplier whose 
Texas contacts consisted of depositing money in a Texas bank and 
occasionally sending personnel to Texas for training.
45
 
After remaining silent for a quarter century and only a month 
after granting certiorari on Daimler, the Court issued its third opinion 
on the subject in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown.
46
 
There, a unanimous Court set forth an “essentially at home” standard 
by announcing that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations . . . when their affiliations with the State . . . 
render them essentially at home in the forum State.”
47
 While the 
Goodyear court did introduce a new standard for general jurisdiction, 
the Court did not entirely flesh out the concept. Goodyear did not 
guide lower courts “tasked with determining the level of business 
contacts that may subject a foreign corporation to a forum’s general 
personal jurisdiction.”
48
 Goodyear suggested that a company could 
be “essentially at home” outside of its state of incorporation or 
principal place of business, but provided no example for lower 
courts.
49
 
 
 42. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 43. 466 U.S. 408 (1984); see Borchers, supra note 2, at 10 (“From 1945 to 2011, the Court 
issued only two opinions exploring the general jurisdiction side of the minimum contacts test.”). 
 44. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437. 
 45. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408. 
 46. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see Borchers, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that the Supreme Court 
had “remained silent on the contours of its ‘minimum contacts’ test for a quarter century”). In 
2011, the Court agreed to hear two jurisdictional cases, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), and Goodyear. In Nicastro, the Court “failed to produce a majority 
opinion . . . [and] continued to remain hopelessly divided over the boundaries of so-called ‘stream 
of commerce’ jurisdiction.” Borchers, supra note 2, at 2 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980)). 
 47. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court issued Goodyear 
after it had already granted certiorari on Daimler. 
 48. Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process Contours of 
General Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 49, 49 (2012). 
 49. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. As a result, confusion as to the application of general 
jurisdiction plagued most states. Tarin & Macchiaroli, supra note 48, at 58. Most often, courts 
struggled in situations where large revenues represented only a small portion of a corporation’s 
total revenue. Id. For example, the Ninth Circuit examined the volume of MBUSA’s sales in 
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IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
In granting certiorari on Daimler, the Court attempted to further 
define the contours of general jurisdiction by answering the open-
ended questions posed by Goodyear. The Court initiated its analysis 
by tracing the history and development of general jurisdiction.
50
 The 
Court attributed the fundamental principles of personal jurisdiction to 
International Shoe,
51
 and noted that after that case, specific 
jurisdiction came to occupy center stage in the modern 
jurisprudence.
52
 The Court acknowledged that after International 
Shoe, it had only ever visited general jurisdiction in Perkins, 
Helicopteros, and Goodyear, and as such, general jurisdiction 
occupied a “less dominant place in the contemporary scheme.”
53
 
Next, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit’s imputation of 
MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler.
54
 The Court dismissed the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis because it resulted in a “sprawling view of general 
jurisdiction,” which the Court had previously rejected in Goodyear.
55
 
The Court emphasized that Goodyear presented only a limited set of 
circumstances that would render a defendant amenable to general 
jurisdiction.
56
 The paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction, as 
established in Goodyear, include the corporation’s principal place of 
business and its place of incorporation.
57
 However, the Court 
emphasized that Goodyear did not hold that a corporation could only 
be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum where it is incorporated 
or has its principal place of business.
58
 Again, the Court opened the 
door to a possibility outside of the paradigmatic bases, but did not 
provide any guidance for lower courts. Instead, it merely reiterated 
the Goodyear standard that the forum state should be equivalent to 
 
California, which accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler’s worldwide sales, and could not overlook 
that nearly 50 percent of Daimler’s overall revenue originated in the United States. Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 50. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 755. 
 53. Id. at 757–58. 
 54. Id. at 758–59. 
 55. Id. at 760. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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an individual’s domicile, one in which the corporation is fairly 
regarded as “‘essentially at home.’”
59
 
The Court then briefly turned to Daimler’s affiliations with 
California and concluded that because neither Daimler nor MBUSA 
were incorporated or maintained their principal places of business in 
California, the exercise of general jurisdiction would not be proper.
60
 
Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s analysis: “The problem, 
the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too 
few, but that its contacts with other forums are too many.”
61
 The 
Court viewed Daimler’s California contacts in the context of 
Daimler’s global operation.
62
 In doing so, the Court refined its 
“essentially at home” standard into a proportionality test that 
measures in-state contacts against the company’s out-of-state 
contacts.
63
 
Notably, the Court did not arrive at its conclusion after closely 
scrutinizing Daimler or MBUSA’s contacts with California. Instead, 
the Court overlooked the fact-intensive analysis required in 
answering jurisdictional questions and hung its hat on policy.
64
 The 
Court turned to the transnational context of the dispute as a 
justification for its holding.
65
 According to the Court, if Daimler’s 
activities were sufficient for general jurisdiction, the “same global 
reach would presumably be available in every other State in which 
MBUSA’s sales [were] sizable.”
66
 The Court found such an 
expansive view of general jurisdiction to be troublesome because of 
 
 59. Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 
(2011)). 
 60. Id. at 761–62. 
 61. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 762, n.20 (majority opinion). The Court clarified that “[g]eneral jurisdiction 
instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and 
worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of 
them.” Id. 
 63. Id. at 762. 
 64. “The majority's decision is troubling all the more because the parties were not asked to 
brief this issue.” Id. at 766 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). “At no point in Daimler’s petition for 
certiorari did the company contend that, even if this attribution question were decided against it, 
its contacts in California would still be insufficient to support general jurisdiction. The parties’ 
merit briefs . . . focused on the attribution-of-contacts question, addressing the reasonableness 
inquiry (which had been litigated and decided below) in most of the space that remained.” Id. at 
766. 
 65. Id. at 762 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. at 761. 
BLUNDER OF SUPREME PROPORTIONS 5/10/2015  7:47 PM 
Fall 2014] BLUNDER OF SUPREME PROPORTIONS 299 
the risks it posed to international comity.
67
 The Court noted that 
“[o]ther nations do not share the uninhibited approach to personal 
jurisdiction advanced by the [Ninth Circuit] in this case”.
68
 Such 
“‘expansive views of general jurisdiction,’” the Court asserted, have 
impeded international negotiations and foreign investment.
69
 The 
Court compared the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the European 
Union’s standard, which provides that a corporation may only be 
sued in a nation in which it maintains its principal place of 
business.
70
 The Court concluded that subjecting Daimler to general 
jurisdiction would not accord with notions of “fair play and 
substantial justice” in the transnational context.
71
 
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment alone.
72
 Justice 
Sotomayor deemed the majority’s approach “wrong as a matter of 
both process and substance.”
73
 She argued that the Court should have 
decided the case on reasonableness grounds.
74
 According to Justice 
Sotomayor, the Ninth Circuit’s holding could have been reversed 
simply because “the case involve[d] foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign 
defendant based on foreign conduct.”
75
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
This part first explains that the Court should have avoided the 
general jurisdiction inquiry altogether. It then examines how the 
Court’s attempt at clarification resulted in an even more restrictive 
interpretation of the doctrine. Next, it explains that the Daimler 
opinion marks a shift away from concerns of fairness and 
predictability—the very principles underpinning personal 
jurisdiction—in favor of protecting big business from jurisdictional 
vulnerability. 
 
 67. Id. at 763. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
2013 WL 3377321). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 764. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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A.  A New, More Restrictive Approach to General Jurisdiction 
The Court should have denied certiorari on Daimler because 
either granting or reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling had the 
potential to “make very bad law.”
76
 Affirming the Ninth Circuit 
would have greatly expanded the scope of general jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs relied on MBUSA’s California contacts because, although 
MBA had connections to the alleged atrocities committed in 
Argentina, it had no California contacts.
77
 If parent corporations 
were subject to general jurisdiction due to subsidiary relationships 
like the relationship between Daimler and MBUSA, the scope of 
general jurisdiction would be seemingly limitless.
78
 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, Daimler further limits the 
Goodyear standard for general jurisdiction. Although the Court did 
not explicitly restrict the scope of general jurisdiction to the place of 
incorporation or the principal place of business, Daimler presents a 
significant obstacle for plaintiffs establishing general jurisdiction 
outside of these two paradigmatic bases.
79
 The Court expressly 
declined approving the exercise of general jurisdiction in all states 
“in which a corporation engages in substantial, continuous and 
systematic course of business.”
80
 Although the Court did not 
preclude the rare instance in which a corporation may be “essentially 
at home” outside of its place of incorporation or principal place of 
business, Daimler seems to suggest that it should be viewed as a very 
narrow exception to the general rule.
81
 
Additionally, Daimler’s restrictive standard casts doubt on 
Perkins, the Court’s textbook example of general jurisdiction.
82
 
According to Justice Sotomayor, if the Court had applied its “newly 
minted proportionality test,” Perkins would have “come out the other 
way.”
83
 In Perkins, the Court found the exercise of general 
jurisdiction to be proper even though the company was not 
 
 76. Sherry, supra note 5, at 111. 
 77. See id. at 114 (“MBA [had] connections to the atrocities but no connection to 
California.”). 
 78. See id. at 114 (“If this combination of subsidiaries means that the parent corporation is 
subject to general jurisdiction in California, then effectively every global corporation will be 
subject to general jurisdiction in the United States for any of its activities worldwide.”). 
 79. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 761 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. 
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incorporated and did not maintain a principal place of business in 
Ohio.
84
 There, the contacts included the corporate president keeping 
files in his Ohio home, maintaining active bank accounts, 
distributing salary checks, and hosting directors’ meetings.
85
 By the 
time the suit had commenced, the company had actually resumed 
operations in the Philippines.
86
 There, the Court did not look at the 
company’s contacts in the Philippines, but instead, focused on its 
Ohio contacts.
87
 “In light of these facts, it is all but impossible to 
reconcile the result in Perkins with the proportionality test” that the 
Court sets forth in Daimler.
88
 Even though the Court did not 
explicitly overturn Perkins, its reasoning in Daimler undermines the 
validity of Perkins, which previously served as the standard for 
general jurisdiction outside the paradigmatic bases.
89
 
B.  The Lopsided Consequences Post-Daimler 
The Court’s test breeds unfair results and undermines notions of 
“fair play and substantial justice.”
90
 First, the majority’s approach 
will lead to an expanded “scope of jurisdictional discovery.”
91
 
Although the Court noted that its decision would not change the 
scope of discovery, it is impossible to imagine how Daimler would 
not result in increased jurisdictional discovery at the district court 
level.
92
 Now, lower courts will need to identify the scope of a 
company’s contacts in other forums in addition to its in-state 
contacts.
93
 This increased jurisdictional burden on lower courts runs 
afoul of the principle that simple jurisdictional rules ensure greater 
predictability.
94
 
Second, the new test makes individuals and small businesses 
more amenable to suit than corporations that conduct substantially 
 
 84. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 87. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48. 
 88. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Grossi, supra note 1 (“[T]he fundamental principles are submerged beneath opaque 
formulas that are both too broad and too narrow and all too often open to conflicting 
interpretations and applications.”). 
 91. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion). 
 93. Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 94. See Grossi, supra note 1 (“[A]t its heart, the law of personal jurisdiction is simple and 
elegant.”). 
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more business within a state.
95
 For example, an individual defendant, 
whose only contact with the forum state is a “one-time visit[,] will be 
subject to general jurisdiction if served with process during the 
visit.”
96
 However, a large company that owns property, employs 
workers, and conducts substantial business will be immune to suit 
because it has greater contacts elsewhere.
97
 Similarly, a small 
business will be amenable to suit in California for any cause of 
action “even if the small business incorporates and sets up 
headquarters elsewhere.”
98
 Unlike Daimler, the small business’ 
California sales will be considered substantial enough when viewed 
in light of its entire operation.
99
 Such results seem unfair, especially 
given the intimate link between personal jurisdiction and due process 
rights.
100
 
Third, Daimler presents a roadblock for plaintiffs deciding 
where to file suit against both foreign and domestic corporations. 
The Court’s approach shifts the risk of loss from corporations to the 
individuals harmed by their actions.
101
 As Justice Sotomayor states in 
her concurrence, “a parent whose child is maimed due to the 
negligence of a foreign hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate 
will [now] be unable to hold the hotel [accountable] in a single U.S. 
court, even if the hotel has a massive presence in multiple States.”
102
 
The majority’s approach in Daimler, Justice Sotomayor posited, 
precludes such plaintiffs from seeking recourse anywhere in the 
United States.
103
 
Importantly, the principle announced in Daimler applies to U.S. 
companies. Even though the present case involved foreign plaintiffs 
and a foreign corporate defendant, the Court did not frame the issue 
 
 95. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. at 772. 
 97. Id. at 773. 
 98. Id. at 772. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Grossi, supra note 1 (“The importance of personal jurisdiction cannot be 
overstated . . . [P]ersonal jurisdiction is deeply intertwined with the litigants’ due process rights. 
Also, the outcome of cases is significantly influenced, if not entirely determined, by decisions on 
jurisdiction and choice of law, with the latter often deeply influenced by the former.”). 
 101. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. Similarly, a U.S. business that contracts with a “foreign country to sell its products to 
a multinational company there may be unable to seek relief in any U.S. court if the multinational 
company breaches the contract, even if that company has considerable operations in numerous 
U.S. forums.” Id. 
 103. Id. 
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as exclusively applicable to foreign corporations.
104
 As a result, 
moving forward, the standard will also preclude general jurisdiction 
over a U.S. company that maintains its principal place of business 
and place of incorporation in another state.
105
 As indicated by Justice 
Sotomayor’s example, the ramifications of Daimler will greatly 
impact a plaintiff’s choice of and access to a convenient forum. 
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court picked a poor platform 
to clarify the Goodyear standard. Instead of refining its “essentially 
at home” standard in a case that implicated transnational concerns, 
the Court should have denied certiorari on Daimler AG v. Bauman 
and avoided the general jurisdiction inquiry altogether. The Court’s 
attempt to further elucidate Goodyear resulted in an even more 
restrictive standard for general jurisdiction, which loses sight of the 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
106
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104. Id. at 773 n.12. 
 105. Id. Justice Sotomayor provided the example of “a General Motors autoworker who 
retires to Florida.” Id. Under the new principle, he “would be unable to sue GM in [Florida] for 
disabilities that develop[ed] from the retiree’s labor at a Michigan parts plant, even though GM 
undertakes considerable business operations in Florida.” Id. 
 106. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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